P.K. SHARMA

Cyber security intelligence, AI governance, practitioner analysis

ConnectWise Cloud Backup's app credential, not a person's: Huntress gives 162, over 300 and almost 1,000 tenants

Huntress's post confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants by 19:00 UTC on 16 October. Its 17 October update adds almost 1,000 tenants with sign-in activity from the same address, over 300 successful, without saying how the counts relate. No source says data was taken.

By · LinkedIn · · 41 min read

Update, 10:19 BST on 18 October: ConnectWise says it disabled seven application identities, six of them Cloud Management, and took two more services offline

Update, 10:19 BST on 18 October 2026.

ConnectWise updated its advisory at 01:00 UTC on 18 October. It says it disabled seven application identities, six of them Cloud Management, at 07:00 UTC on 17 October, and that disabling "does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant". The shared Cloud Backup credentials "are no longer valid", but access tokens issued earlier "may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated". "As an additional precaution" it took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline, and is "reviewing other potentially affected partner facing services". The new entry drops the 17:00 UTC "no indication" line about other products; the undated FAQ keeps it.

Huntress said at 10:30 AM ET (14:30 UTC, derived), with high confidence, that three Cloud Management apps were abused and "it does not look like these apps have been disabled by ConnectWise". ConnectWise puts the disabling at 07:00 UTC, 7 h 30 min before that (derived), and says "A vendor action and a customer-tenant setting are different controls". Huntress's 5:15 PM ET update (21:15 UTC, derived) says ConnectWise "has communicated that they have disabled relevant apps", without a time. Neither source reconciles the times; ConnectWise does not say Cloud Management was abused.

The headline has changed: it had said Huntress says 162 tenants. Huntress's page still gives 162 (19:00 UTC, 16 October), and its 5:15 PM ET update adds "almost 1,000" tenants with sign-in activity, "Over 300" successful, without saying how the three counts relate.

Not stated: how the credential left the vendor's hands, the tenant total, which tenants, whether data was read or copied, and when service returns.

Update, 21:12 BST on 17 October: ConnectWise says the shared credentials are no longer valid, and Huntress and ConnectWise differ on Cloud Management

Update, 21:12 BST on 17 October 2026.

ConnectWise updated its advisory at 17:00 UTC. It says it suspended Cloud Backup "by revoking certificates used for affected application connections across all users", and "The shared credentials previously used for Cloud Backup are no longer valid and cannot be used." That partly answers the earlier question of rotation: it does not say new credentials were issued. It also "cannot determine through our investigation alone" whether a given customer's tenant was affected.

Huntress added an update at 10:30 AM ET (14:30 UTC, 15:30 BST, derived), with "high-confidence that the threat actor has also abused" three ConnectWise Cloud Management applications (Exchange Online, Microsoft Teams, SharePoint Online), and says they do not look disabled. ConnectWise's statement, 2 h 30 min later (derived), has "no indication that any other ConnectWise product, service, or offering is impacted". The two do not match, and neither page explains why. Cloud Management is not Cloud Backup.

Huntress still says 162, as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October; 173 is still not on its page.

Not stated: how the credential left the vendor's hands (ConnectWise: "remains under investigation"), the tenant total, which tenants, whether data was read or copied, and when service returns. Microsoft: reported by BleepingComputer, not found on Microsoft's own pages at 21:12 BST; the post it links is on Microsoft Threat Intelligence's X account, readable only as far as "tracking an active supply chain attack". The diagram below was redrawn to show 17:00 UTC. This update was overtaken in part by the update above of 18 October.

Huntress's page says 162 tenants. The headline that cites Huntress says 173.

Huntress published its account on 16 October 2026 and says that as of 19:00 UTC that day (20:00 BST) it had confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants, made with a credential belonging to the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application, formerly SkyKick. The Hacker News reported on 17 October that Huntress had observed confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 173 partner and customer tenants. The two figures differ by 11, which is 6.8 per cent of 162 (derived). The Huntress page, read at 11:47 BST and again at 11:54 BST on Saturday 17 October, says 162 and does not contain 173. Todyl's post and ConnectWise's advisory give no tenant count, and the two other write-ups read either give none or repeat 162. So 173 is either a later Huntress update that had not reached the page read here, or it comes from somewhere that could not be read. This briefing says 162 where it quotes Huntress and 173 only where it quotes the headline. Huntress's update of 5:15 PM ET on 17 October (21:15 UTC, derived) adds a different measure, "almost 1,000" tenants with sign-in activity from the address it ties to the activity, "Over 300" of which succeeded, while its main text still says 162 as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October (see the update at the top).

The second computed fact is about time. Huntress puts the Cloud Backup sign-ins between 06:13 and 08:34 UTC on 15 October, a window of 141 minutes (derived). If all 162 tenants fell inside it, which the page does not say, that is one tenant every 52 seconds on average (derived). Huntress also says the actor moved through tenants "a few seconds apart". Both statements can be true only if the script touched many tenants that Huntress cannot see, or if the 162 were not all reached in that window. The page does not say which. Todyl, watching its own tenants, saw the same application and the same source address in a different window, 07:11 to 08:47 UTC, so the two vendors' windows together span 154 minutes (derived). The counts describe what two security companies could see in the tenants they watch. They do not describe how far the credential went.

The headline says a ConnectWise credential was used to sign in. Read against the primary sources, that sentence leaves a lot open. It does not say the credential was a person's: Huntress describes an application's credential, held in the vendor's own tenant. It does not say how many of the tenants had mail, files or Teams data read: no source confirms any. It does not say how the credential left the vendor's hands, why ConnectWise's first advisory came 35 h 34 min after the first sign-in Huntress saw (derived), who the tenants belong to, or whether any are in the UK or the EU. It does not say whether other vendors' application credentials are affected. No source read cites a CVE, and the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, dated 16 October 2026 at 17:15 UTC, has no Cloud Backup or SkyKick entry.

Interests, in one sentence: Huntress and Todyl sell managed detection and response to MSPs, ConnectWise sells the product and is the party whose application credential was used, and Microsoft sells the Entra licences that carry the logging and controls discussed here, so every claim below is attributed to the party that made it.

What was read, and how

The news article is the secondary source here, and the primary sources are the security companies' own posts, the vendor's own advisory and Microsoft's documentation. All were read in full on Saturday 17 October 2026 between 11:47 and 12:10 BST. This is a developing story, so any figure below can be overtaken: ConnectWise's advisory carried two entries 11 hours apart (derived) when first read and has since added a third, at 17:00 UTC on 17 October, and a fourth, at 01:00 UTC on 18 October. Huntress, which said it would keep updating its post, added updates at 10:30 AM ET and 5:15 PM ET on 17 October (14:30 UTC and 21:15 UTC, derived). The advisory, Huntress's post, Todyl's post and BleepingComputer's article were read again at 21:12 BST on 17 October, and the advisory, its status page, Huntress's post, Todyl's post and The Hacker News's article of 18 October at 10:19 BST on 18 October (see the update at the top).

  • The Hacker News, 17 October: the article that carries the 173. Secondary. It also covers an unrelated update-server compromise of a backup product, which is not used here.
  • Huntress blog post, 16 October: read in full twice. Primary for the sign-in window, the 162, the other ConnectWise applications and the mitigation steps. Re-read at 21:12 BST on 17 October, when it carried an update dated 10:30 AM ET on 17 October, and at 10:19 BST on 18 October, when it also carried one dated 5:15 PM ET.
  • ConnectWise Trust Center advisory page and its status page entry: both entries of each when first read, the first published at 17:47 UTC on 16 October and the update of 05:01 UTC on 17 October (the status page stamps them one and ten minutes later), and a third entry of 17:00 UTC on 17 October (the status page stamps it 17:04 UTC), read at 21:12 BST on 17 October, and a fourth entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October (the status page stamps it 01:24 UTC), read at 10:19 BST on 18 October. Primary for what the vendor says.
  • Todyl blog post, 16 October: its own tenants' view. It answered a plain request with a bot check, which was not completed; it was read later in a browser tab where the article had loaded. Re-read at 21:12 BST on 17 October and at 10:19 BST on 18 October: its text still says "Last updated on: October 16, 2026", and no entry was found in the update log it promises at the end of the page.
  • The Hacker News, 18 October: relays ConnectWise's entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October: the seven disabled identities, the 07:00 UTC time and the access-token sentence. Secondary. Read at 10:19 BST on 18 October.
  • Microsoft Learn, NCSC, the ICO, Cyber Essentials and the Bill text: read as cited below.
  • Not read: two community threads linked by the news article (scripted pages that returned no text), a post by one security vendor seen only as a search-result snippet, an advisory by another that an aggregator write-up cites, and any ConnectWise partner-only page.

Who counted what, and over what

Every number in this story is a count of something different. Setting them side by side shows how little the largest of them covers.

Counts in the sources, with their basis. Read 17 October 2026; rows added or extended on 18 October were read at 10:19 BST that day. Percentages are derived.

Source and dateWhat it countsLimits
Huntress blog, 16 October162 tenants with confirmed unauthorised sign-ins, as of 19:00 UTC on 16 OctoberTenants Huntress can see. It says it cannot check tenants without the Entra licensing, and that the actor is "not limited to the tenants we have confirmed so far"
Huntress blog, update of 5:15 PM ET on 17 October (21:15 UTC, derived)"Almost 1,000" Entra tenants with sign-in activity from the address it ties to the activity, "Over 300" of which succeeded. A second wave on 15 October targeted 16 Huntress-protected tenants, without successA different measure from the 162, which the page still gives as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October. The page does not say how the two relate. It says that where the application's service principal was absent the actor did not gain access
Huntress blog, same postThe application authenticated from the hosting address in 17 of the first 290 or so tenants checked, across 17 partner accounts (5.9 per cent, derived)An earlier, smaller sample from 06:13 to 08:34 UTC on 15 October. The 5.9 per cent cannot be projected onto tenants not checked
The Hacker News, 17 October173 partner and customer tenants, attributed to HuntressNot on the Huntress page read at 11:47 and 11:54 BST. No time, window or method is given
BleepingComputer, 17 October"At least 162" compromised tenants, attributed to Huntress. Says the victim count and the extent of data theft "remains unclear"Secondary. "At least" is not on the Huntress page, which says 162 as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October (re-read at 21:12 BST). No time, window or method is given
Todyl blog, 16 OctoberNo tenant count. Nine tenants had no active backup subscription, and a token was still issued in themTenants Todyl monitors. Sign-ins 07:11 to 08:47 UTC on 15 October, one per tenant
ConnectWise advisory, 16 to 18 October (four entries)No count of tenants, partners or customersSays it identified "unauthorized access to application identities" in its Cloud Backup environment. Its entry of 17:00 UTC on 17 October says it "cannot determine through our investigation alone" whether a particular customer's tenant was affected, and its entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October says Cloud Backup does not provide the downstream visibility needed to determine this independently
Huntress blogAbout 50 tenants where ConnectWise Cloud Management applications assigned themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator, from 01:58 UTC on 15 OctoberHuntress says the pattern points to vendor automation but has not confirmed that with ConnectWise. Its update of 10:30 AM ET on 17 October (14:30 UTC, derived) says it has high confidence the actor also abused three Cloud Management applications; it does not say whether that changes this reading
Huntress blogOne tenant where a Cloud Management application made itself Global Administrator and changed two other applicationsThe one tenant audit log Huntress reviewed in detail. The page does not say how many others were reviewed

The sequence, in UTC, and the gaps worked out

What each source states, in order. Times are UTC unless a date alone is given. BST is one hour ahead.

When (UTC)What the source statesSource
13 to 14 October, times not givenPassword spraying from one hosting address against four tenants of law firms. Two accounts were locked out. Huntress saw no successful user sign-in from that addressHuntress
15 October, from 01:58In about 50 Huntress-monitored tenants, ConnectWise Cloud Management applications assigned themselves directory rolesHuntress
15 October, 03:44 to 03:49In one tenant, a Cloud Management application added itself to Global Administrator and made nine changes to two other applications. Six succeeded, three failedHuntress
15 October, 06:13 to 08:34The Cloud Backup application authenticated from the hosting address in tenants Huntress checked, in sorted order, a few seconds apartHuntress
15 October, 07:11 to 08:47Sign-ins as the Cloud Backup application in tenants Todyl monitors, one per tenant, 1 to 6 minutes apart in sorted orderTodyl
15 October, 09:25 to 14:20Huntress update: a "second, targeted wave of attempts" from the same address against 16 Huntress-protected tenants in the policy, national security, trade and critical-mineral sectors, "unsuccessfully"; first sweep 09:25:04 to 12:35:50, second sweep 13:54:39 to 14:20:24, which "appeared to be manual"Huntress
16 October, 17:47 (18:47 BST)ConnectWise: investigating "recent attempts of unauthorized access"; containment in place; no indication partner backup data has been accessedConnectWise
16 October, 19:00Huntress: unauthorised sign-ins confirmed in 162 tenantsHuntress
17 October, 05:01 (06:01 BST)ConnectWise: "unauthorized access to application identities"; shutting off Cloud Backup application access until further notice; no indicators that partner backup data has been compromisedConnectWise
17 October, 07:00 (08:00 BST)ConnectWise, as stated in its entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October: disabled seven application identities (ConnectWise Cloud Backup; ConnectWise Cloud Management; and the Cloud Management identities for MS Teams, Exchange Online, MS Graph, Partner Center and SharePoint Online). Disabling prevents new authentication and "does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant"ConnectWise
17 October, 14:30 (10:30 AM ET, converted; derived)Huntress update: "high-confidence" that the threat actor also abused three ConnectWise Cloud Management applications (Exchange Online, Microsoft Teams, SharePoint Online); "it does not look like these apps have been disabled by ConnectWise"Huntress
17 October, 17:00 (18:00 BST)ConnectWise: suspended Cloud Backup by revoking certificates; "The shared credentials previously used for Cloud Backup are no longer valid"; third-party incident response firm engaged; "no indication that any other ConnectWise product, service, or offering is impacted"; cannot determine whether a particular customer's tenant was affected; FAQ gives 14 October as the date it identified the issueConnectWise
17 October, 21:15 (5:15 PM ET, converted; derived)Huntress update: ConnectWise "has communicated that they have disabled relevant apps" (no time given); "almost 1,000" tenants with sign-in activity from the address it ties to the activity, "Over 300" of which succeededHuntress
17 October, time not givenThe Hacker News: 173 tenants, attributed to HuntressThe Hacker News
18 October, 01:00 (02:00 BST)ConnectWise: the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid; previously issued access tokens "may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated"; a third-party forensics firm engaged; SaaS Security and Cloud Management taken offline; "reviewing other potentially affected partner facing services"; no restoration timeConnectWise

ConnectWise says it "recently identified" the access and that it started incident response on detecting it. As first read, its advisory did not say when it detected anything. Its FAQ, read at 21:12 BST on 17 October, now says "We identified the issue on October 14, 2026", with no time or zone and no account of what was identified that day. So the intervals below run between what Huntress observed and when ConnectWise published. They are not detection times, and the window Huntress saw is the span of what it could see, not the span of the compromise.

Intervals between printed times (derived by subtraction; see calc-output.txt, which does not include the last seven rows, added at 21:12 BST on 17 October and at 10:19 BST on 18 October).

IntervalLength (derived)
First role self-assignments Huntress saw (15 October, 01:58) to its first Cloud Backup sign-in (06:13)4 h 15 min
Global Administrator change in one tenant (03:44) to the first Cloud Backup sign-in (06:13); Huntress says about two and a half hours2 h 29 min
First Cloud Backup sign-in Huntress saw (06:13, 15 October) to ConnectWise's first advisory (17:47, 16 October)35 h 34 min
Last sign-in Huntress saw (08:34) to ConnectWise's first advisory33 h 13 min
ConnectWise's first advisory to Huntress's 162 count (19:00)1 h 13 min
ConnectWise's first advisory to its update shutting off access (05:01, 17 October)11 h 14 min
First sign-in Huntress saw to the shut-off update46 h 48 min
Huntress's update (10:30 AM ET, converted to 14:30 UTC) to ConnectWise's update (17:00 UTC), both 17 October2 h 30 min
ConnectWise's first advisory (17:47 UTC, 16 October) to its update of 17:00 UTC on 17 October23 h 13 min
14 October, the date ConnectWise gives for identifying the issue (no time or zone given), to its first advisory (17:47 UTC, 16 October)About 38 to 66 hours, reading the date in zones from Eastern Time to UTC
ConnectWise's stated disabling of the seven application identities (07:00 UTC, 17 October) to Huntress's update saying three Cloud Management apps did not look disabled (10:30 AM ET, converted to 14:30 UTC)7 h 30 min
ConnectWise's stated disabling (07:00 UTC, 17 October) to Huntress's update saying ConnectWise had communicated that it had disabled relevant apps (5:15 PM ET, converted to 21:15 UTC)14 h 15 min
ConnectWise's stated disabling (07:00 UTC, 17 October) to the advisory entry that states it (01:00 UTC, 18 October)18 h
ConnectWise's first advisory (17:47 UTC, 16 October) to its stated disabling of the seven identities (07:00 UTC, 17 October)13 h 13 min

The earliest dated event tied to the same source address is the spraying on 13 and 14 October, three days before ConnectWise's advisory date (derived). Spraying user accounts is a different act from using an application credential, and Huntress saw no successful user sign-in from it. Whether the credential was held earlier than 15 October is not stated.

An application's credential, not a person's: what Microsoft documents

Microsoft's overview of permissions and consent describes two ways an application reaches data. In delegated access it acts for a signed-in user. In app-only access it acts "only as the application's own identity", which Microsoft says is used in scenarios such as automation and backup. App-only access uses application permissions, which only an administrator can consent to, and an application holding a file permission of that kind can read any file in the tenant.

A multitenant application, in Microsoft's description of application objects, has one application object in the vendor's own tenant, and a service principal in each tenant where it has been consented to. The service principal defines what the application can do in that tenant. That is the shape the reports describe. Huntress says the credential type was a client assertion, so that "the credential lives in the vendor's own tenant", and that nothing a customer did could have produced it. Todyl says the application held tenant-wide read and write access to mail and attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files and Teams chats in each consenting tenant, and the ability to restore data, and that the actor's activity was limited to signing in with the already-approved application. The customer's administrator gave that consent earlier, to a legitimate product. Microsoft's own page on admin consent calls granting it "a sensitive operation" that can give a publisher access to "significant portions of your organization's data".

Huntress says app-only sign-ins involve "no user, no device, and no MFA prompt". Microsoft's page on Conditional Access for workload identities, last updated 24 March 2026, says workload identities cannot perform multifactor authentication and that the policies apply to single-tenant service principals registered in the customer's own tenant: "Microsoft and third-party SaaS applications, including multitenant apps, are not covered by these policies." Todyl's account agrees: Conditional Access was not applied to the sign-ins, and it says least-privilege consent and removing unused applications are the main controls left to a customer. Huntress lists Conditional Access for workload identities, Identity Protection and application management policies among controls that make a planted secret harder to use or easier to spot. On Microsoft's wording those help for applications in the customer's own tenant, such as the single-tenant Huntress application that received a new secret, and not for the vendor's multitenant backup application.

None of the sources reports that granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) or any partner staff account was involved. Microsoft's GDAP introduction describes "least-privileged access" for partners to customers' workloads, granular and time-bound, and Conditional Access has a separate service provider user target for partner staff. Both govern people who sign in as partners. An application signing in as itself is outside both, so a customer who reviewed its partner relationships this week would have found nothing about this event.

What a customer can do is specific and limited. Disabling the application in its own tenant, which Microsoft says prevents all tokens being issued for it there, stops new tokens. Tokens already issued last up to 90 minutes (Todyl), which fits Microsoft's default access-token lifetime of 60 to 90 minutes. Only the vendor can rotate its own credential (Todyl). The sign-ins sit in the Service principal sign-ins tab, not the default user tab (Huntress), one of the four log types Microsoft lists in its sign-in log overview. Per Microsoft's retention table, sign-in and audit logs are kept for seven days on Entra ID Free and 30 days on P1 and P2, so a free-tier tenant starts losing 13 October entries on 20 October, three days after 17 October (derived). Graph activity logs, which record each request, need a P1 or P2 licence, are not kept unless sent somewhere, and start only when switched on. Todyl says they were not being collected in the tenants where it could not tell the actor's reads from the backup service's.

Play the flow below, or move the token by hand. It follows the credential from the vendor's own tenant through Microsoft Entra to each consenting tenant and to what the token opens, as at 01:00 UTC on 18 October 2026. It marks what the sources do not state and the one point on which Huntress and ConnectWise are not reconciled: the Cloud Management applications. Huntress's later counts of over 300 and almost 1,000 tenants are in the update at the top.

How one credential reaches every consenting tenant
How one credential reaches every consenting tenant. A flow of four stages as at 01:00 UTC on 18 October 2026: the vendor's tenant held the Cloud Backup application's credential, now invalid, ConnectWise says; Microsoft Entra issues a Graph token, no person and no device; each consenting tenant (162 confirmed by Huntress as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October) holds the consent, the switch and the logs; the token opens mail, files, Teams chats and directory data. Notes mark what is not stated and one point not reconciled. Hover or tap for exact quotes. Open static version.
Who holds what in the incident, drawn from Microsoft's documentation and the Huntress, Todyl and ConnectWise pages, as at 17:00 UTC on 17 October 2026. No identifiers are drawn.

What the record states, and what it does not

Stated and not stated, from the Huntress post, the Todyl post and the ConnectWise advisory page as read on 17 October 2026 (11:47 to 12:10 BST; rows touched by the later updates were re-read at 21:12 BST on 17 October and at 10:19 BST on 18 October).

QuestionStatedNot stated
Whose credential?An application's: Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, held by the vendor. Huntress: a client assertion, living in the vendor's own tenant; no user involvedWhether it was a secret or a certificate. Huntress's summary says "API secret" and its body says client assertion; Todyl's prose says client secret and its log field says client assertion. ConnectWise's update of 17:00 UTC on 17 October says it revoked "certificates used for affected application connections"; it does not say which kind of credential was stolen
How was it obtained?Nothing. Huntress says it is "in hostile hands"; ConnectWise gives no cause. Its FAQ, read at 21:12 BST on 17 October, says the "original credential-exposure mechanism remains under investigation" and that whether a product vulnerability contributed "has not been established"The method, the date it was lost, and whether it left a vendor system, a repository or a person's device
What happened after sign-in?Graph tokens obtained, one per tenant, in sorted order (Todyl). In the one audit log Huntress reviewed in detail, no mail or file access. Todyl found no directory changes by the backup application. ConnectWise, 01:00 UTC on 18 October: "A successful sign-in alone does not establish that data was copied", and a clean search cannot rule out activity that was not captured in the logs. Huntress, 5:15 PM ET on 17 October: its second sweep of 16 tenants on 15 October "appeared to be manual"; it has external reports of "what appears to be hands-on activity" that it has not independently verifiedWhether any mail, file, Teams or directory data was read or copied. Huntress: directory reads leave no audit trail. Todyl cannot separate the actor's reads from the backup service's
How many tenants?162 (Huntress, 19:00 UTC, 16 October). 173 (The Hacker News, 17 October). 17 partner accounts in an earlier sample. BleepingComputer, 17 October, says "at least 162". Huntress's page, re-read at 21:12 BST, still says 162 as of 19:00 UTC on 16 October and does not contain 173. Re-read at 10:19 BST on 18 October, its main text still says 162 and does not contain 173, and its update of 5:15 PM ET on 17 October (21:15 UTC, derived) adds "almost 1,000" tenants with sign-in activity from the address it ties to the activity, "Over 300" of which succeededThe source of 173, how the 162, the "almost 1,000" and the "Over 300" relate, the total number of tenants where the application is consented, and any UK or EU count
Who are they?"Partner/customer" tenants (The Hacker News); tenants Huntress and Todyl can see, including Huntress partners' tenants. Huntress's update of 17 October says it has seen "what might be an affinity towards alphabetical targeting", its "most interesting victims" starting with "A", and that all tenants should still be scrutinised. Its update of 5:15 PM ET on 17 October says a second wave on 15 October targeted 16 of its protected tenants, in the policy, national security, trade and critical-mineral sectors, without successHow many are ConnectWise's partners and how many are those partners' clients. Four tenants of law firms were sprayed on 13 and 14 October; no sector is stated for the tenants with confirmed sign-ins. ConnectWise's status page lists the affected location as "All Regions" and gives no country count
Why was detection not faster?ConnectWise says it "recently identified" the access and, in its FAQ read at 21:12 BST on 17 October, that it identified "the issue on October 14, 2026"The time and zone of the 14 October identification, what was identified that day, who saw it first, and why its first advisory (17:47 UTC on 16 October) came 35 h 34 min after the first sign-in Huntress saw (derived) and about 38 to 66 hours after 14 October (derived, the date being given without a time)
What has ConnectWise done?Shut off Cloud Backup application access until further notice (update of 05:01 UTC, 17 October); published a source address and client identifiers; "no indicators to date" that partner backup data is compromised. Update of 17:00 UTC, 17 October: suspended Cloud Backup by revoking certificates used for affected application connections across all users, says the shared credentials previously used "are no longer valid", has engaged "a reputable third-party incident response firm" (its entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October says "a reputable third-party forensics firm"), has "no evidence" the encrypted archives were accessed, and has "not observed successful threat activity in the environments we monitor" since the mitigations. Entry of 01:00 UTC, 18 October: says it disabled seven application identities at 07:00 UTC on 17 October, six of them Cloud Management identities; that disabling "does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant"; that previously issued access tokens "may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated"; that, "as an additional precaution", it has temporarily taken SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline; and that it is reviewing other potentially affected partner facing servicesWhether replacement credentials have been issued (the 17:00 UTC update says the old shared credentials are no longer valid, not that they were rotated), whether the credentials of the Cloud Management applications are valid or revoked (its entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October says those applications were disabled and the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid, and does not say the same of the Cloud Management credentials), which other partner facing services it is reviewing, when SaaS Security and Cloud Management return, when service returns (it says it does not have "a restoration time to share yet"), how many partners it has told (it says it emailed and called partners directly), and whether any customer's tenant was affected (it says it "cannot determine" this)
Other applications?Huntress: a second ConnectWise application gave itself Global Administrator in one tenant and added secrets to two other applications; it cannot verify the remaining ConnectWise applications are secure. Huntress's update of 10:30 AM ET on 17 October (14:30 UTC, derived): "high-confidence" the threat actor also abused ConnectWise Cloud Management applications for Exchange Online, Microsoft Teams and SharePoint Online, and "it does not look like these apps have been disabled by ConnectWise". ConnectWise, 17:00 UTC on 17 October: "no indication that any other ConnectWise product, service, or offering is impacted" (its undated FAQ still says so; its entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October does not repeat it, lists six Cloud Management identities among the seven it says it disabled at 07:00 UTC on 17 October, and says it has taken SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline). Huntress, 5:15 PM ET on 17 October (21:15 UTC, derived): ConnectWise "has communicated that they have disabled relevant apps"How ConnectWise's 07:00 UTC disabling squares with Huntress's 14:30 UTC (derived) remark that the apps did not look disabled (neither source reconciles them: Huntress's later update gives no time for the disabling, and ConnectWise does not mention Huntress or say Cloud Management was abused), what evidence ties the Cloud Management activity to the actor, whether that and the Cloud Backup sign-ins were one operator (Huntress's main text, unchanged, says it has not tied them), and whether other vendors' applications are affected
CVE or alert?None cited. The CISA catalogue of 16 October (17:15 UTC) lists ConnectWise ScreenConnect entries and none for Cloud Backup. ConnectWise says whether a product vulnerability contributed "has not been established"Any CISA or NCSC alert. None was found; both sites' search pages are scripted and could not be searched conclusively

ConnectWise's own advisory has moved across its four entries. The first, at 17:47 UTC on 16 October, speaks of "recent attempts of unauthorized access". The second, at 05:01 UTC on 17 October, speaks of "unauthorized access to application identities" and tells customers where in the Entra sign-in log to look. The third, at 17:00 UTC on 17 October, says it suspended Cloud Backup by revoking certificates, that the shared credentials previously used are no longer valid, and that it has engaged a third-party incident response firm. It does not mention Cloud Management. The fourth, at 01:00 UTC on 18 October, says it disabled seven application identities at 07:00 UTC on 17 October, six of them Cloud Management identities; that the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid; that it has engaged a third-party forensics firm; that it has taken SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline; and that it is reviewing other potentially affected partner facing services. It does not repeat the "no indication" line of the third, and it does not say Cloud Management was abused. Todyl, whose post is dated 16 October, noted that the first entry did not mention Microsoft 365, the application or its credential. Todyl's own caution on the data question is worth keeping next to the vendor's: "The absence of confirmed exfiltration is partly a visibility limit rather than a clean result."

Friendly names: eight words that carry more than they show

Words in the headline and the reports, and what the sources show behind each.

WordWhat it suggestsWhat the sources show
CredentialA person's username and password, protected by MFAAn application's proof of identity, held by the vendor. The sources call it an API secret, a client assertion and a client secret. Huntress says there is no MFA prompt for it
CompromisedKnown theft and known damageHuntress: the credential is in "hostile hands" and was used. Huntress says any organisation with the app installed is affected; Todyl says to assume every tenant with it enabled is compromised. Neither states data was taken
Sign inA person typed a passwordAn application asked Entra for a token as itself, once per tenant, from a script. Success means a token was issued, not that anything was read
TenantAn organisationA Microsoft Entra directory. The sources count tenants only, which is not a count of organisations, users or mailboxes
PartnerA trusted resellerThree meanings in one story: ConnectWise's partners, who buy Cloud Backup; Huntress's partners, whose tenants it watches; and Microsoft's partner relationships such as GDAP. Only the first two appear in the reports
DelegatedSomeone acts for you, with limitsConnectWise's product page advertises "delegated authentication for a seamless zero trust approach". In Microsoft's terms delegated access acts for a signed-in user. The reports describe app-only access. The sources do not say how the two relate
Supply chainA distant, rare riskThree parties, three different things held: the vendor holds the credential, the MSP chose the product and holds the contract, and the customer's administrator gave the consent
MSPA security specialistNCSC calls an MSP's own systems "a juicy target". Here the route in was the MSP's supplier's credential, not an MSP account

The same trust-in-a-trusted-tool pattern appeared in an earlier briefing on this site, where a genuine, signed remote-management installer put a second remote tool on devices. The mechanism differs, because that case ran on endpoints and this one runs on a cloud identity, but in both the property that made the tool trusted was the property that made it useful to an attacker.

Rotating the vendor's credential is necessary, and not enough

In one Huntress partner tenant, Huntress reports that a second ConnectWise application, Cloud Management for Microsoft Teams, added itself to the Global Administrator role at 03:44 UTC on 15 October, then made nine changes to two other applications in about five minutes (03:44 to 03:49, derived). The two were an MSP management application and Huntress's own application. Six changes succeeded and three failed (66.7 per cent succeeded, derived). The successful ones added new client secrets, set to expire in 2028, which is between 443 and 808 days after 15 October 2026 (derived).

Huntress's reading is that a credential on an MSP management application can extend access beyond one tenant, because such applications are often consented in the MSP's customers' tenants, and it says it has not seen that happen. Three points follow from the page. First, Huntress says disabling the ConnectWise applications "will not remove credentials that were already added", so a customer has to review credentials on all of its applications, not only ConnectWise's. ConnectWise's entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October says that "disabling the original applications does not remove those separate access paths". Second, a secret planted in a customer's own tenant is a customer-side artefact, and ConnectWise rotating its own credential does not touch it. Third, the relationship between this earlier activity and the later Cloud Backup sign-ins is not settled. Huntress's main text says it has no source address for the earlier events and has not tied the two phases to one operator (the page still says so at 21:12 BST on 17 October and at 10:19 BST on 18 October); the sign-ins began 2 h 29 min after the Global Administrator change (derived); and Todyl found no directory changes by the backup application in its own tenants. As at 16 October the record described two phases of unclear relationship, not one proven campaign. Huntress's update of 10:30 AM ET on 17 October, placed above that unchanged text, speaks of "the threat actor" having "also abused" three Cloud Management applications, which reads as one actor (inference), and does not say what evidence ties them. Its update of 5:15 PM ET on 17 October says the actor "appears to have used access from the ConnectWise app family" to add a credential to a Huntress application in one tenant, and that this access came from private Azure address space, not the address behind the sign-ins.

UK: what applies today, and where each piece stops

No source read says that any UK organisation is among the tenants, and none says that none is. That is a gap in itself. A UK customer of an MSP that uses Cloud Backup can check its own tenant whether or not it was among the 162, and the guidance below applies either way.

UK guidance and law as read from the pages cited, on 17 October 2026, and where each stops.

InstrumentWhat it says, as readWhere it stops
NCSC, Choosing a managed service provider (SME guide, 24 November 2025)Apply least privilege to the MSP, require 2-step verification on the MSP's own access, ask how long logs are kept and whether you can see them, fix incident-notification times in the contract, and ask whether you have assessed the MSP's supply chain risksWritten around the MSP's people and access. It does not mention applications consented in your tenant or credentials a vendor holds
NCSC, Using MSPs to administer your cloud services (blog, 10 January 2023)An MSP's own systems can be "a juicy target". The contract should oblige the MSP to tell you of breaches, including "any breaches that happened in the MSP's own supply chain"Speaks of accounts, devices and administrator access. It does not mention consent or application permissions, and it predates this event by three years and nine months (derived)
NCSC, supply chain security guidanceTwelve principles in four stages: understand the risks, establish control, check your arrangements, continuous improvementOnly the landing page was read for this briefing, not the principles themselves. It is written for large organisations and the public sector
Cyber Essentials, Requirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3 (April 2026)Accounts used by third parties such as an MSP are in scope. Authentication to cloud services must always use MFA. User accounts are removed or disabled when no longer requiredThe wording is about user accounts. A search found nothing on service accounts, machine accounts or application permissions, and Huntress says app-only sign-ins have no MFA prompt
UK GDPR, ICO guide to personal data breachesA controller reports a notifiable breach within 72 hours of becoming aware, where feasible, and may give details in phases. A processor must tell the controller "without undue delay". Breaches include access by an unauthorised third partyWhether any personal data was accessed is the open question: the reports establish tokens issued, not reads. Awareness and risk are judgements the controller must record
Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, HL Bill 49 as amended in Grand CommitteeA managed service is ongoing IT management under contract, delivered by connecting to or obtaining access to the customer's systems. A relevant managed service provider that is not micro or small would notify the Information Commission within 24 hours (initial) and 72 hours (full) of becoming aware of a significant incident, then tell the UK customers likely to be affectedNot law. Lords report stage is listed for 26 October, nine days after 17 October (derived), and these duties start on a day set by regulations. The text does not say whether a vendor of an automated backup application that connects by consent provides a managed service, or whether a stolen vendor credential is an incident in the systems an MSP relies on

The Bill is read in detail in an earlier briefing on this site, on its AI gap and its report-stage amendments. For this story the point is narrow: the Bill would put 24-hour and 72-hour duties on larger managed service providers, with customer notification after them, but the text read does not decide whether the product vendor in a case like this is inside it. Stage dates can move; the 26 October date is provisional.

The 72 hours, as arithmetic. Counting from ConnectWise's first advisory, published at 17:47 UTC (18:47 BST) on Friday 16 October, 72 hours ends at 18:47 BST on Monday 19 October (derived), and a weekend sits inside it. That is an illustration and not a legal view. The ICO says the clock runs from becoming aware and points to the Article 29 Working Party guidelines for when a controller is aware, and whether a personal data breach occurred is the very thing the record does not establish. A customer whose tenant had the application consented should record, today, when it became aware, what it checked, and why it did or did not report. The ICO guide says a processor must tell its controller without undue delay, so the question to put to an MSP is when it became aware, not only what it knows.

What to do, in order

Three lists, because the three readers hold different things. Each is ordered by what is cheapest and most time-limited first. They draw on Huntress's and Todyl's recommendations and on Microsoft's documentation, and they stop where the sources stop: none of this can confirm that data was not taken.

Take this with you

For an organisation that uses an MSP

  • In the Entra admin centre, open Enterprise applications and search for ConnectWise Cloud Backup, SkyKick and ConnectWise Cloud Management. Note which are present and who consented to each.
  • Before changing anything, export what each holds and save the service principal sign-in log (the Service principal sign-ins tab, not the default user tab). On Entra ID Free the log keeps seven days, so entries from 13 October begin to disappear on 20 October (derived).
  • Disable each application in your tenant, without deleting it: Huntress says deletion removes the consent and a restore would need a fresh one, and Todyl also advises disabling rather than deleting. Expect backups to pause and ask your MSP what covers the gap. ConnectWise says its list of the seven application identities it disabled on 17 October does not document a separate local change in every customer tenant, so check the setting in yours.
  • Review the credentials, secrets and certificates, on every enterprise application and app registration, especially management and security tools, for any added since 13 October that you did not create. Remove the unexpected ones.
  • Check which directory roles any ConnectWise or SkyKick application holds, and in the audit log look for one adding itself to a role or changing another application. Once it is disabled, remove any role you did not grant on purpose.
  • Ask your MSP in writing: is the application consented in your tenant, since when, with which permissions, with an active subscription or not, who approved it, who is your named contact for this incident, and when did the MSP first become aware.
  • If you hold the licence, switch on Microsoft Graph activity logs and send them somewhere you control. They are not retroactive.
  • Record, today, when you became aware, what you checked, and whether you judge a personal data breach to have occurred. The 72 hours run from awareness, and the weekend counts.
  • Do not re-enable until ConnectWise confirms all credentials are reset (Huntress). As at 17:00 UTC on 17 October ConnectWise had said the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid, and had said nothing about the credentials of the Cloud Management applications. Its entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October says to keep affected applications disabled until it provides restoration instructions, and still says nothing about whether the Cloud Management credentials are valid. When you do re-enable, grant the minimum permissions and ask whether the application needs write access at all.
  • Review partner relationships and partner sign-ins too (GDAP roles, Conditional Access for service provider users), but expect nothing about this event there: they govern people, not applications.

Take this with you

For an MSP

  • List every ConnectWise and SkyKick application in your own tenant and in each client tenant you manage, with its permissions and subscription status. Todyl found tokens issued in nine tenants with no active subscription.
  • Check your own management and security tool applications first for credentials added since 13 October. Huntress asks MSPs to start there.
  • Disable, without deleting, in tenants where you are certain of the scope. Tell each client in writing what you did, what you saved and what you could not see, with a named contact.
  • Remove the consent for any vendor application whose subscription has lapsed or whose purpose has ended.
  • Reduce who can add credentials: limit the Application Administrator and Cloud Application Administrator roles, and use application management policies to restrict or cap the lifetime of new secrets. Microsoft says the tenant default policy exists and is disabled by default, and that it does not block tokens for existing applications.
  • Ask each vendor whose application is consented across your clients how its credential is held and rotated, whether credentials are per tenant, how fast you would be told, and whether it can limit where the application signs in from.
  • Hold your own client contracts to the NCSC's questions: notification time, who tells whom, log retention, and breaches in your own supply chain.

Take this with you

For a CISO

  • Count the third-party multitenant applications consented in your estate and rank them by the breadth of their application permissions. Start with any that can read every mailbox or file without a user.
  • Accept what Conditional Access cannot do here. Microsoft says it does not cover third-party multitenant apps, so the controls you hold are least-privilege consent, removal of unused applications, log collection and the contract.
  • Decide who may grant tenant-wide admin consent, and make each grant a recorded, reviewed decision. Microsoft calls it a sensitive operation.
  • Alert on the events Huntress names: a service principal adding itself to a directory role, an application being modified by another application, credentials added to a service principal, and service principal sign-ins from outside the vendor's normal range.
  • Keep service principal sign-in and audit logs beyond the 7 or 30 day defaults, and switch on Graph activity logs.
  • Write the supplier clause: notification in hours, including events in the supplier's own supply chain, a named route, and a statement of what it will tell you about credential rotation.
  • Run a table-top: a vendor application credential is stolen, the vendor's first advisory arrives 35 hours after the first sign-in, and your logs cover seven days. What can you prove?
  • Track the Bill. If you are an MSP above the micro and small thresholds, its 24-hour and 72-hour duties and customer notification would apply once in force. If you buy from one, expect to receive those notices.

The question that exposes the gap

Which of the third-party applications consented in your tenant could read every mailbox without a person signing in, who holds the credential that proves each one is genuine, and who would tell you within hours, rather than days, if that holder lost it?

In this case the accounts of what happened inside customer tenants come from two security companies watching their own customers, and the vendor's first advisory came 35 h 34 min after the first sign-in Huntress saw (derived). Who detected it first is not stated, though ConnectWise's FAQ now gives 14 October as the date it identified the issue, and neither is how a customer that was not being watched could have known earlier.

Key facts

Sources

  1. PrimaryBlog post 'ConnectWise (SkyKick) Vendor Credentials Abused in M365 Attacks', published 16 October 2026, read in full twice on 17 October (11:47 and 11:54 BST), again at 21:12 BST, and at 10:19 BST on 18 October, when it carried updates of 10:30 AM ET and 5:15 PM ET on 17 October: the 162 tenants as of 19:00 UTC, the 'almost 1,000' tenants with sign-in activity, the Cloud Management applications, the 06:13 to 08:34 UTC window, the one-tenant Global Administrator finding and the mitigation stepsHuntressaccessed 2026-10-18
  2. PrimaryTrust Center advisories page, four entries: first published 16 October 2026 at 17:47 UTC, updated 17 October at 05:01 UTC and 17:00 UTC, and 18 October at 01:00 UTC (the last read at 10:19 BST on 18 October); the vendor's statement, the shut-off of Cloud Backup access, the revoked certificates, the shared credentials no longer valid, the seven disabled application identities, the services taken offline, the access-token wording, the 14 October identification date and the FAQConnectWiseaccessed 2026-10-18
  3. PrimaryProduct and Services Status entry 'ConnectWise Cloud Backup Issue Investigation Security Issue': the same four statements, stamped 17:48 UTC on 16 October, 05:11 UTC and 17:04 UTC on 17 October, and 01:24 UTC on 18 October, with the location listed as All RegionsConnectWiseaccessed 2026-10-18
  4. PrimaryBlog post 'Investigation: Unauthorized Access Through the ConnectWise Cloud Backup Microsoft 365 App', published and last updated 16 October 2026 (still so at 21:12 BST on 17 October and at 10:19 BST on 18 October): its own tenants' window of 07:11 to 08:47 UTC, nine tenants with no active subscription, the visibility limit and the remediation steps. Read in a browser tab after a plain request met a bot check that was not completedTodylaccessed 2026-10-18
  5. PrimaryProduct page for ConnectWise Cloud Backup: what the product covers (Exchange, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams, Entra ID) and the 'delegated authentication for a seamless zero trust approach' wordingConnectWiseaccessed 2026-10-17
  6. PrimaryOverview of permissions and consent in the Microsoft identity platform (updated 18 March 2025): delegated versus app-only access and application permissionsMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  7. PrimaryApplication and service principal objects (updated 1 October 2024): the application object in the home tenant and a service principal in each consenting tenantMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  8. PrimaryConditional Access for workload identities (updated 24 March 2026): workload identities cannot perform MFA; policies do not cover third-party multitenant appsMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  9. PrimaryIntroduction to granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP), updated 28 April 2026: partner access to customer workloadsMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  10. PrimaryConditional Access users and groups (updated 24 March 2026): the service provider user target for partner staffMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  11. PrimaryGrant tenant-wide admin consent to an application (updated 25 March 2025): the wording on the sensitivity of admin consentMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  12. PrimaryDisable user sign-in for an application (updated 15 October 2026): disabling the service principal in a tenant prevents tokens being issued thereMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  13. PrimaryConfigurable token lifetimes: the default access-token lifetime of 60 to 90 minutesMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  14. PrimarySign-in logs in Microsoft Entra ID (updated 18 November 2025): the four types, including service principal sign-insMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  15. PrimaryMicrosoft Entra data retention: seven days on Free and 30 days on P1 and P2 for sign-in and audit logs; Graph activity logs only for P1 and P2Microsoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  16. PrimaryMicrosoft Graph activity logs (updated 4 July 2026): licensing, destinations and what they recordMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  17. PrimaryApplication management policies API overview (updated 14 May 2026): the tenant default policy is disabled by default and does not block tokens for existing applicationsMicrosoft Learnaccessed 2026-10-17
  18. PrimaryKnown Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, release dated 16 October 2026 17:15 UTC: ConnectWise ScreenConnect entries only, none for Cloud Backup or SkyKickCISAaccessed 2026-10-17
  19. PrimaryChoosing a managed service provider (MSP), SME guide, published 24 November 2025: least privilege, 2-step verification, logs, incident notification and supply chain questionsNational Cyber Security Centreaccessed 2026-10-17
  20. PrimaryUsing MSPs to administer your cloud services, blog post of 10 January 2023: the MSP as an attack surface and the contract wording on breaches in the MSP's own supply chainNational Cyber Security Centreaccessed 2026-10-17
  21. Primary12 principles of supply chain security, landing page: four stages. The principles themselves were not readNational Cyber Security Centreaccessed 2026-10-17
  22. PrimaryRequirements for IT Infrastructure v3.3, April 2026: third-party accounts in scope, MFA for cloud services, user accounts, and no wording on application permissionsNational Cyber Security Centre, Cyber Essentialsaccessed 2026-10-17
  23. PrimaryPersonal data breaches: a guide: 72 hours from becoming aware, phased reporting, processor duty to inform the controller without undue delayInformation Commissioner's Officeaccessed 2026-10-17
  24. PrimaryHL Bill 49, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill as amended in Grand Committee: the managed service definition, the relevant managed service provider incident duties (24 and 72 hours), customer notification and commencement by regulationsUK Parliamentaccessed 2026-10-17
  25. PrimaryParliament's Bills service, stages for Bill 4035, read 17 October 2026: Lords report stage listed for 26 OctoberUK Parliamentaccessed 2026-10-17
  26. PrimaryPost dated 17 October 2026 (no time given) on Microsoft Threat Intelligence's X account, the post BleepingComputer links as Microsoft's: only the opening of its public preview was read ('tracking an active supply chain attack'); the full text needs a signed-in view and was not read; the public preview and Microsoft's own security and response blog pages were checked again at 10:19 BST on 18 October and no post on the incident was found thereMicrosoft Threat Intelligence (X)accessed 2026-10-18
  27. Reported byNews article of 17 October 2026 headlined 'Hackers Use Compromised ConnectWise Credential to Sign In to 173 Microsoft 365 Tenants': the source of the 173, which is not on the Huntress page. Secondary. A plain curl request returns a bot check; a request with a browser User-Agent was read in fullThe Hacker Newsaccessed 2026-10-17
  28. Reported byNews article of 17 October 2026 (11:18 AM, no time zone on the page) headlined 'Hackers breach Microsoft 365 tenants via ConnectWise supply-chain attack'. Secondary. Repeats 162 as 'at least', says the victim count, the extent of data theft and the method of obtaining the vendor credentials remain unclear, and reports a Microsoft post of 17 October that was not found on Microsoft's own sites at 21:12 BSTBleepingComputeraccessed 2026-10-17
  29. Reported byNews article of 18 October 2026 headlined 'ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Backup After Attackers Compromise Microsoft 365 Tenants'. Secondary. Relays ConnectWise's entry of 01:00 UTC on 18 October: the seven disabled application identities, the 07:00 UTC time on 17 October and the access-token sentence. Read with a browser User-Agent at 10:19 BST on 18 OctoberThe Hacker Newsaccessed 2026-10-18

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