Operation IXIM: Eye Security says it served over 2 million updates that disabled an abandoned Popcorn Time updater
Dutch security firm Eye Security says that between November 2025 and March 2026 it used the insecure update mechanism of Time4Popcorn, a Popcorn Time fork, to serve over 2 million update downloads that stop and disable the updater on Windows and macOS. Eye says the updater ran as SYSTEM or root and contacted domains that were no longer registered. Eye says the application itself is still unsafe and advises uninstalling it.
By Parminder Kumar Sharma · LinkedIn · · 12 min read
Correction, 26 October 2026: the headline figure, an attribution and two file paths were corrected
An audit on 26 October checked this briefing against Eye Security's post. What changed: the earlier text said two million devices were neutralised, but Eye says over 2 million update downloads; Shadowserver was credited as co executor when it only received 15 domains afterwards; the macOS file is PT.updd.plist, not the name printed; the Windows path was corrected; and the dead links were replaced. The hero figure was replaced.
Eye Security says it disabled an abandoned Popcorn Time updater with over 2 million update downloads
Eye Security, a Dutch security firm, says that between November 2025 and March 2026 its research team (Eye Research) disabled the update mechanism of Time4Popcorn, a closed-source variant of the Popcorn Time BitTorrent client, by serving an update to systems running the software. Eye says the updater ran with high privileges (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Windows, root on macOS) and would download and run any executable it was pointed to, with no code signing and over HTTP, and that it contacted domains that were no longer registered. Eye says it sent out over 2 million update downloads. Eye presented the work at the Hack.lu conference in Luxembourg on 22 October 2026 and published its write-up the same day. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-30612; Eye says it published an advisory in June 2026, and the CVE record was published on 27 August 2026. Eye is this briefing's only source for what the operation did; the Shadowserver Foundation's home page does not mention it.
Eye says it noticed a process called Updater.exe on a client's laptop during a threat hunt, trying to reach popcorntimeupd.xyz, a domain that was no longer registered. Eye registered the domain to see what would connect and saw about 50 requests per second, which is about 4,320,000 per day if the rate held for 24 hours (derived). Over six months Eye saw over 3.8 million hardware IDs, about half on Windows, about 45 percent on macOS and under 5 percent on Android. Eye later found that hardware IDs undercount Windows hosts and overcount macOS hosts, and estimates about 2.5 to 3.0 million Windows hosts and 250,000 to 350,000 macOS hosts. Eye did not serve updates to Android. Eye says the updater also tried other domains, some owned by third parties and offered for sale for thousands of dollars, so registering one domain would not have reached every client.
Quantitative telemetry and computed operational impact
The figures below are Eye Security's own counts and estimates from its write-up, with this site's derived figures labelled.
Quantitative operational telemetry and derived remediation metrics for Operation IXIM
| Operational Metric | Recorded Telemetry | Strategic Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Estimated Vulnerable Population | About 2.75 to 3.35 million Windows and macOS hosts (derived by adding Eye's two estimates; Android excluded) | Eye estimates 2.5 to 3.0 million Windows hosts and 250,000 to 350,000 macOS hosts. Its raw count was over 3.8 million hardware IDs, which Eye says is unreliable in both directions. |
| Neutralising Payloads Delivered | Over 2 million update downloads | Eye counts downloads, not devices. It says some Windows hosts requested the update repeatedly and that products blocked it, so downloads are not a count of disabled updaters. This site does not compute a coverage percentage. |
| Sinkhole Query Volume | About 50 requests per second | About 4,320,000 per day if the rate held for 24 hours (derived). Eye does not say how long the rate held. |
| Operational Duration | November 2025 to March 2026 | The period Eye gives for disabling the updater. Eye says it transferred the 15 domains it owned to the Shadowserver Foundation in late March 2026. |
| Query Traffic Reduction | 98 percent reduction in update requests | Eye says that on 1 March 2026 it was still sending about 5000 updates per day, which it puts at a 98 percent reduction, and that it saw a 90 percent reduction a few weeks after the December 2025 rollout passed a million systems. |
| Execution Privilege Context | SYSTEM (Windows) / root (macOS) | Eye says the updater ran in the background as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Windows and as root on macOS, with no code signing. |
| Vulnerability Tracking ID | CVE-2026-30612 | CWE-494 and a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8 (critical) come from the CISA ADP entry on the CVE record. The record's description covers Time4Popcorn for Windows up to 6.2.1.18, macOS up to 6.2.1.17 and Android up to 3.5.0.173. |
Epistemic audit of confirmed research findings versus unstated operational factors
The matrix contrasts what Eye Security's write-up states with what it leaves unstated.
Epistemic matrix comparing confirmed technical disclosures against unstated operational factors
| Analytical Dimension | Explicitly Confirmed in Research Disclosures | Unstated or Operationally Unresolved |
|---|---|---|
| Discovery Trigger | Observed during a routine threat hunting engagement on a corporate client laptop contacting popcorntimeupd.xyz. | The corporate identity or industry vertical of the initial client where the abandoned updater was first identified. |
| Update Delivery Protocol | Eye says there was no code signing and the process ran over unencrypted HTTP. | Whether any cybercriminal threat actors attempted to register the expired domains prior to Eye Security. |
| Payload Action Scope | On Windows the update stops and disables the service named Update service (sc.exe stop and sc.exe config with start= disabled, as Eye prints them). On macOS it runs launchctl unload -w on the PT.updd launch daemon. Eye says the update has no telemetry and deletes no files. Eye's web server did log requests, including hardware IDs and IP addresses, which Eye analysed. | The proportion of home and enterprise hosts among the update downloads. Eye says most clients are probably home users and that it also saw connections from government, military and corporate networks. |
| Antivirus Interactions | Eye says that about a week after someone uploaded its update to VirusTotal, 11 vendors detected it as malicious, and VirusTotal's AI summary described it as malware. Eye says reporting false positives to every vendor would have taken weeks, so it changed its code until one vendor detected it. | The complete list of specific antivirus vendors whose automated detections blocked early iterations of the neutraliser. |
| Permanent Infrastructure Status | Eye says it transferred the 15 domains it owned to the Shadowserver Foundation in late March 2026 so that a trusted third party sinkholes them, and that it could not transfer domains it did not own. The Shadowserver Foundation's home page does not mention the transfer. | The total annual infrastructure and DNS renewal cost absorbed by non-profit foundations to maintain the sinkhole. |
The friendly-name fallacy: How background convenience breeds high-privilege zombies
Eye's write-up describes an update mechanism that did the opposite of its label. The Windows service is simply named Update service, and the updater polled domains over HTTP and would run any executable it was pointed to, with no code signing, as SYSTEM or root. This site's inference: a service whose name says update is not evidence that its updates are authenticated.
Eye says none of its clients were actively using the software, that most had installed it years ago and probably forgotten about it, and that the updater kept running in the background and regularly checking for updates. Eye does not give installation years or say how long the service had run.
Technical details as Eye Security describes them
Phase 1: What Eye says the Time4Popcorn updater was
Eye describes Time4Popcorn as a closed-source variant of Popcorn Time, so no source code was available. The Windows updater is Updater.exe, written in C++ with Boost 1.55 (released in 2013), usually under C:\Program Files\Popcorn Time\Updater.exe and run as a service named Update service as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The macOS updater is PT.updd, usually under /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/PT.updd and started at boot by a launch daemon defined in /Library/LaunchDaemons/PT.updd.plist, running as root. On Android there is no background process: the app checks for updates when opened and the user is asked whether to install an APK. Eye says a separate project that started in early 2025 and uses the Popcorn Time name to build a legal alternative is not covered by its research.
Phase 2: How the update mechanism worked (CVE-2026-30612)
Eye reverse engineered the updater. It sent requests of the shape GET /?app_id=T4PSEC&hid=HARDWAREID&ver=6.1.0.0&os=WIN060200 over unencrypted HTTP, where hid is a hardware identifier (value omitted here). Eye says the program expects a JSON response, and that supplying a link to an executable was all that was needed for it to download the file and run it as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, with no code signing. On macOS Eye says the result was the same, code execution as root, with a different JSON format. Eye does not describe the Windows or macOS system calls used, a download directory or the HTTP status code.
Phase 3: The domains
Eye says the updater tried several domains. At first it owned one; the others were registered by third parties, many parked or for sale for thousands of dollars, and the macOS and Android versions used different domains, many still unregistered. Eye considered buying them all and judged it would probably not work: if any domain could not be bought the plan would be ineffective, and HTTP updates would still be exposed to anyone able to manipulate a user's traffic. Eye notes that in some countries governments have used insecure update processes to install spyware on dissident PCs. Eye does not state a price for any domain or how fast an attacker could have reached the installed base.
Phase 4: Registering the domain and serving the update
Eye says it registered popcorntimeupd.xyz out of curiosity during a threat hunt, saw the traffic arrive, reverse engineered the updater, and decided to disable it remotely after its legal team advised it. Eye says it ran extensive tests and a small-scale test first, and built a system that could deploy the update to specific systems. On Windows the update stops and disables the service through the Service Control Manager; Eye prints the equivalent commands as sc.exe stop "Update service" and sc.exe config "Update service" start= disabled. On macOS Eye uses a shell script that runs launchctl unload -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/PT.updd.plist. Eye says that is all the update does: no telemetry and no file deletion. To limit copying, Eye first served the update only to hardware IDs it had seen before, once per ID, and redirected clients to HTTPS where possible; after a few weeks it relaxed those limits. Eye states the period November 2025 to March 2026 for disabling the updater and does not give the month it registered the domain.
Phase 5: False positives, results and handover
Eye says someone uploaded its update to VirusTotal and a week later 11 vendors detected it as malicious. Eye says every product that blocked the update left the vulnerable updater running, that reporting false positives to every vendor would have taken weeks, and that it downloaded some of the products and changed its code until only one vendor detected it. Eye reports an update deployed to more than a million systems by December 2025, a 90 percent reduction in update requests after a few weeks, and about 5000 updates per day on 1 March 2026, which it calls a 98 percent reduction. It then stopped offering the update, having sent out over 2 million update downloads. In late March 2026 it transferred the 15 domains it owned to the Shadowserver Foundation. Eye also says hardware IDs were an unreliable way to count hosts: on Windows many machines shared one ID, for example a cloned manufacturer image, and on macOS Eye believes the ID changed when a hostname or hardware address changed.
Defensive checklist for enterprise IT and managed service providers
Eye Security's recommendations are to look for the indicators it lists and to uninstall Popcorn Time. The items below follow Eye's write-up; item 5 is this site's inference.
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Hunt for the updater: on Windows look for a service named Update service and a file Updater.exe, usually under C:\Program Files\Popcorn Time. On macOS look for PT.updd, usually under /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/, and the launch daemon file /Library/LaunchDaemons/PT.updd.plist.
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Remove the software: Eye's advice is to uninstall Popcorn Time. Eye says its update only disabled the updater and the application is built on a Chrome engine from 2014 with the sandbox disabled. Until a host is cleaned, Eye prints the commands that stop and disable the service: sc.exe stop "Update service" and sc.exe config "Update service" start= disabled on Windows, launchctl unload -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/PT.updd.plist on macOS.
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Search DNS and proxy logs for the 20 domains Eye lists, defanged: besttime4popcorn[.]info, goldtime4popcorn[.]info, itspopcorntime[.]info, mypopcorntime[.]info, pct-upd[.]info, pctupd[.]info, popcornforever[.]info, popcorngoldtime[.]info, popcorntime-upd[.]xyz, popcorntime-update[.]xyz, popcorntimeupd[.]xyz, realpopcorntime[.]info, sunnypopcorn[.]info, t4p-upd[.]info, time2popcorn[.]info, time4popcorn[.]info, upd-pct[.]info, updatepopcorntime[.]xyz, updpct[.]info, updpopcorntime[.]xyz. Eye says some of these are still owned by third parties.
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Endpoint security vendors: Eye recommends marking the Updater.exe and PT.updd file hashes as potentially unwanted programs and removing the files.
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This site's inference, not from Eye: an inventory of installed software that flags abandoned products with background services running as SYSTEM or root would have found this one.
The exposing question for cybersecurity leaders
If your organisation relies on automated endpoint detection tools to safeguard corporate data, how many unmonitored shadow software update services are currently running with SYSTEM privileges on your remote laptops, polling domains that nobody you know controls?
Key operational facts
Essential technical and operational parameters for Operation IXIM
| Operational Parameter | Verified Technical Detail |
|---|---|
| Operation Codename | Operation IXIM |
| Primary Investigating Entity | Eye Security (its Eye Research team) |
| Infrastructure Stewardship Partner | The Shadowserver Foundation, which Eye says received the 15 domains Eye owned in late March 2026 |
| Vulnerability Identifier | CVE-2026-30612 |
| Weakness Classification | CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check |
| Target Application | Time4Popcorn (closed-source abandoned fork of Popcorn Time) |
| Vulnerable Components | Updater.exe (Windows service as SYSTEM) and PT.updd (macOS daemon as root) |
| Interception Mechanism | Eye registered popcorntimeupd.xyz and the other update domains it could register (15 in total, per Eye) |
| Total Estimated Population | About 2.75 to 3.35 million Windows and macOS hosts (derived from Eye's two estimates; Eye's raw count was over 3.8 million hardware IDs) |
| Neutralising Payloads Served | Over 2 million update downloads (Eye's count, not a count of devices) |
| Observed Traffic Drop | 98 percent reduction in update requests by 1 March 2026, per Eye |
| Public Disclosure Venue | Hack.lu, Luxembourg, 22 October 2026 (Eye's write-up and the conference schedule) |
Sources
- PrimaryOperation IXIM: Preventing a botnet of millions of Popcorn Time users, 22 October 2026Eye Security (Eye Research)accessed 2026-10-26
- PrimaryOperation IXIM: Preventing a botnet of millions of PopCorn Time users, 22 October 2026, 17:00 to 17:30Hack.lu 2026 (pretalx schedule)accessed 2026-10-26
- PrimaryCVE-2026-30612, published 27 August 2026CVE Program (assigned by MITRE; CISA ADP enrichment)accessed 2026-10-26


