Microsoft 365 token spraying compromises 79 organisations across 70 days without passwords
Huntress reported on 22 October 2026 a token-spraying campaign against Microsoft 365 that ran from 14 July to 22 September 2026. It responded to incidents at 79 organisations and observed at least 497 successful sign-in events against more than 200,000 failed login attempts. Huntress says the attacker captured sign-in sessions through adversary-in-the-middle relays and other methods, so it did not need passwords, and the stolen token was minted after the victim completed MFA.
By Parminder Kumar Sharma · LinkedIn · · 8 min read
Correction, 26 October 2026: the token count, the derived rates and several attributions were corrected
An audit on 26 October checked this briefing against Huntress's post of 22 October. What changed: the earlier text said 200,497 tokens, but Huntress says at least 497 successful sign-ins against more than 200,000 failed attempts, with no total, so every rate derived from the total was removed; the infostealer names it listed are not in Huntress's post, which describes adversary in the middle relays; the claim of 100 percent MFA bypass was removed because Huntress says Conditional Access can stop replay; and the inbox rule description was corrected. The audit read the Huntress page through summaries because of a bot challenge, so check wording against the original. The hero figure was replaced.
Huntress traced at least 497 successful sign-ins and more than 200,000 failed attempts over 70 days at 79 organisations
Between 14 July and 22 September 2026, a window of 70 days (about ten weeks, derived), Huntress responded to related incidents at 79 organisations that were its customers. It observed at least 497 successful Microsoft 365 sign-in events against more than 200,000 failed login attempts across its customer environments, and traced the failed attempts to the range 193.26.115.0/24. Huntress calls the technique token spraying, the same pattern as password spraying but with stolen tokens instead of guessed passwords, and does not break down what the failed attempts contained. Huntress says the accounts were compromised without the attacker needing a password. This site does not publish a success rate, a daily rate or a tokens-per-breach figure, because Huntress gives no total and does not say that the failed attempts were tokens.
Huntress says the campaign captured sign-in sessions through adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) relays, and it also describes device-code phishing and social engineering during a legitimate login. In an AiTM relay the real login page and MFA prompt pass through to the victim, so the stolen token is minted after MFA and its holder does not need to pass MFA again, in Huntress's account. The post does not name an infostealer. After sign-in, Huntress saw at least 48 rogue Entra devices registered, existing MFA methods wiped and a new one registered within three hours of the first campaign sign-in in 19 organisations, and hidden inbox rules, two of them created within minutes of the first campaign sign-in.
Audit of verified threat intelligence versus identity operational assumptions
To determine the practical blast radius and defense requirements across Microsoft 365 environments, security teams must separate verified telemetry from speculative assumptions regarding cloud identity resilience.
Audit of verified technical disclosures for the Huntress M365 token spraying campaign versus operational assumptions
| Operational Dimension | Explicitly Verified in Threat Intelligence | Unverified or Dependent on Tenant Architecture |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Replay of sign-in sessions captured through adversary-in-the-middle relays, with device-code phishing and social engineering also described, from six rented hosts in 193.26.115.0/24. | Direct cryptographic compromise or structural vulnerability in Microsoft Entra ID infrastructure. |
| Credential Usage | Huntress says the accounts were compromised without the attacker ever needing a password. | Which industries and countries the 79 organisations were in. Huntress gives neither. |
| MFA Interaction | The relay passed the real MFA prompt through to the victim, so MFA was satisfied by the victim and the token was minted after it. Huntress advises treating an AADSTS53003 Conditional Access block as a sign of a valid credential, not a save. | Whether any infostealer was involved. Huntress does not name one. |
| Persistence Mechanism | At least 48 rogue Entra devices, MFA methods wiped and replaced in 19 organisations within three hours of the first campaign sign-in, and hidden inbox rules with names such as a single full stop and sss that moved or hid mail. | The total volume of sensitive intellectual property or financial data exfiltrated prior to session revocation. |
| Attacker Infrastructure | Replay hosts were six addresses in 193.26.115.0/24 operated by 1337 Services GmbH (AS210558, Hamburg). Huntress says mailbox-rule activity came from VPN and rented hosts, none of it from 1337 Services. | Conclusive nation-state or eCrime cartel attribution for the overarching campaign coordination. |
The friendly-name fallacy: why 'MFA enforced' breeds false security
The success of this 70-day campaign exposes a dangerous friendly-name fallacy in enterprise identity governance: the assumption that enforcing multi-factor authentication guarantees tenant invulnerability. Security executives frequently treat MFA as a permanent defensive perimeter, ignoring the fundamental architecture of modern cloud authentication. In federated OAuth and OpenID Connect protocols, multi-factor challenges are evaluated solely during initial authentication to mint signed session tokens. Once issued, those tokens act as bearer credentials.
Microsoft documents Token Protection as a Conditional Access session control that attempts to reduce token replay by accepting only device-bound sign-in session tokens, such as Primary Refresh Tokens, so that a stolen token cannot be used from another device. Microsoft's platform table lists native applications as generally available on Windows, iOS and macOS, and browser-based applications as preview for selected web apps that access Azure Resource Manager on Windows and macOS, and not supported on iOS. This site's inference is that the browser sessions captured by an AiTM relay fall largely outside what Token Protection covers today. Huntress does not name Token Protection among its recommendations.
After replay, Huntress describes three kinds of activity. It saw at least 48 rogue Entra devices registered, named DESKTOP- followed by eight hexadecimal characters. In 19 organisations the victim's existing MFA methods were wiped and a new method registered within three hours of the first campaign sign-in. And it saw hidden inbox rules with names such as a single full stop and sss that moved or hid mail, one of which hid messages mentioning payroll, direct deposit, bank or bonus before a payroll-related email went to an outside accountant.
Remediation engineering: terminating live sessions and binding tokens
Huntress advises revoking sessions and resetting the password, then auditing Entra devices, MFA methods and inbox rules, because a password reset alone leaves attacker-registered devices and MFA methods in place and does not invalidate the access token. Microsoft's guidance for revoking a user's access includes revoking the user's refresh tokens with Revoke-MgUserSignInSession. The commands below act on one user at a time.
# Connect to Microsoft Graph with Identity and Device Governance scopes
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'User.ReadWrite.All', 'Device.ReadWrite.All'
# Revoke all active OAuth refresh tokens and invalidate current sessions
Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId 'compromised.user@organisation.co.uk'
# List devices the user owns, to look for unfamiliar names such as DESKTOP- followed by eight hex characters
Get-MgUserOwnedDevice -UserId 'compromised.user@organisation.co.uk'
# Evict rogue device registration by device ID
Remove-MgDevice -DeviceId '11112222-3333-4444-5555-666677778888'
Microsoft documents Token Protection as one layer, and its supported scope is limited, as the platform table above shows. Huntress's own advice is Conditional Access: require MFA or block for all users, all cloud apps and all client app types, and restrict the device-code flow with authentication-flow policies.
Defender checklist: neutralizing token spraying and session hijacking
Take this with you
Ordered engineering priorities for securing Microsoft 365 tenants
- Revoke sessions for accounts with sign-ins from 193.26.115.0/24 or other signs of token replay, using Revoke-MgUserSignInSession for each affected user, and reset the password, as Huntress advises.
- Audit Entra device registrations since 14 July 2026 for unfamiliar devices, including names of the form DESKTOP- followed by eight hex characters, and check sign-in logs for activity from 193.26.115.0/24 and other 1337 Services (AS210558) addresses.
- Inspect mailbox rules for hidden or oddly named rules, such as single-character names, that move, hide or delete mail, and audit MFA methods for recent changes.
- As general hardening, not a Huntress recommendation, review which of your apps support Continuous Access Evaluation.
- Enforce Conditional Access policies requiring compliant, hybrid Entra joined devices for accessing sensitive corporate data and administration portals.
- Evaluate Token Protection for the platforms Microsoft lists as supported. Microsoft limits browser-based support to selected web apps that access Azure Resource Manager, so this site's inference is that it would not by itself stop replay of a browser session.
- Hunt for OAuth2:Token sign-ins from hosting infrastructure that use the node or a bare Mozilla/5.0 user agent, and disable standard-user consent to new applications, both of which Huntress recommends.
The exposing question
If an attacker relays a real sign-in and keeps the token minted after your user completes MFA, what control in your tenant stops them reading the mailbox this afternoon, and would you see the new device, the replaced MFA method and the hidden inbox rule?
Key facts
Sources
- PrimaryM365 Token Spray and Replay Campaign Compromises Business Email AccountsHuntressaccessed 2026-10-26
- PrimaryHow Token Protection Enhances Conditional Access PoliciesMicrosoftaccessed 2026-10-26
- PrimaryRevoke user access in an emergency in Microsoft Entra IDMicrosoftaccessed 2026-10-26
- Reported byWidespread Token-Spraying Attacks Target Microsoft 365 AccountsInfosecurity Magazineaccessed 2026-10-26
- Reported byMicrosoft 365 Token-Replay Attacks Compromise 97 Accounts at 79 OrganizationsThe Hacker Newsaccessed 2026-10-26


