One credential, every consenting tenant
A flow of four stages with three arrows, drawn from Microsoft documentation and the Huntress, Todyl and ConnectWise pages, as at 01:00 UTC on 18 October 2026. No identifier is drawn. Stage 1, The vendor's own tenant: ConnectWise. Held the Cloud Backup application's credential. Whoever presented it could ask Microsoft for tokens as the application. The sources call it an API secret, a client assertion and a client secret. Stated by ConnectWise, 01:00 UTC on 18 October: the affected shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid. Not stated: how the credential left the vendor's hands. ConnectWise says the mechanism remains under investigation. Arrow: Presented from a hosting address, once per tenant, in sorted order (Huntress, Todyl). Stage 2, Microsoft Entra. Checks the credential and the customer's earlier consent, then issues a Microsoft Graph token. No person signs in and no device is involved. No MFA prompt for an application (Huntress). Conditional Access for workload identities does not cover third-party multitenant apps (Microsoft). Arrow: A token with the permissions the customer's administrator consented to. Stage 3, Each consenting tenant: 162 confirmed by Huntress, 16 Oct. Holds the consent, the switch and the logs. Only the vendor can rotate its credential. The switch in each tenant belongs to that tenant's administrators, not the vendor. Can: disable the app, so new tokens stop. Issued ones may stay usable until they expire (ConnectWise), up to 90 minutes (Todyl). Save service principal sign-in logs: 7 days on Entra ID Free, 30 on P1 and P2. Cannot: rotate the vendor's credential, or apply Conditional Access to the app. Not reconciled, as at 01:00 UTC on 18 October 2026: Huntress (14:30 UTC on 17 October, derived) says three ConnectWise Cloud Management applications were also abused and did not look disabled. Its later update (21:15 UTC, derived) says ConnectWise has communicated that it disabled relevant apps. ConnectWise (01:00 UTC on 18 October) says it disabled seven application identities, those three among them, at 07:00 UTC on 17 October. It does not say Cloud Management was abused. Its 17:00 UTC entry said it had no indication that any other ConnectWise product, service, or offering is impacted; the 01:00 UTC entry does not repeat that, and an FAQ answer on the page still says it. Neither source reconciles the two. Arrow: What those permissions reach. Stage 4, What the token opens. Mail and attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files, Teams chats and directory data. Read and write, and restore (Todyl). Not established: whether any was read or copied. Directory reads leave no audit trail (Huntress). Todyl: absence of confirmed exfiltration is partly a visibility limit.
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The vendor's own tenant: ConnectWise. Held the Cloud Backup application's credential. Whoever presented it could ask Microsoft for tokens as the application. The sources call it an API secret, a client assertion and a client secret.
- Stated by ConnectWise, 01:00 UTC on 18 October: the affected shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid.
- Not stated: how the credential left the vendor's hands. ConnectWise says the mechanism remains under investigation.
Then, from stage 1 to stage 2: Presented from a hosting address, once per tenant, in sorted order (Huntress, Todyl).
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Microsoft Entra. Checks the credential and the customer's earlier consent, then issues a Microsoft Graph token. No person signs in and no device is involved.
- No MFA prompt for an application (Huntress).
- Conditional Access for workload identities does not cover third-party multitenant apps (Microsoft).
Then, from stage 2 to stage 3: A token with the permissions the customer's administrator consented to.
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Each consenting tenant: 162 confirmed by Huntress, 16 Oct. Holds the consent, the switch and the logs. Only the vendor can rotate its credential. The switch in each tenant belongs to that tenant's administrators, not the vendor.
- Can: disable the app, so new tokens stop. Issued ones may stay usable until they expire (ConnectWise), up to 90 minutes (Todyl). Save service principal sign-in logs: 7 days on Entra ID Free, 30 on P1 and P2.
- Cannot: rotate the vendor's credential, or apply Conditional Access to the app.
- Not reconciled, as at 01:00 UTC on 18 October 2026: Huntress (14:30 UTC on 17 October, derived) says three ConnectWise Cloud Management applications were also abused and did not look disabled. Its later update (21:15 UTC, derived) says ConnectWise has communicated that it disabled relevant apps. ConnectWise (01:00 UTC on 18 October) says it disabled seven application identities, those three among them, at 07:00 UTC on 17 October. It does not say Cloud Management was abused. Its 17:00 UTC entry said it had no indication that any other ConnectWise product, service, or offering is impacted; the 01:00 UTC entry does not repeat that, and an FAQ answer on the page still says it. Neither source reconciles the two.
Then, from stage 3 to stage 4: What those permissions reach.
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What the token opens. Mail and attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files, Teams chats and directory data. Read and write, and restore (Todyl).
- Not established: whether any was read or copied. Directory reads leave no audit trail (Huntress). Todyl: absence of confirmed exfiltration is partly a visibility limit.
Tap a stage, an arrow or a note to read the exact words and the source.
Position as at 01:00 UTC on 18 October 2026. Derived means this site's arithmetic. No identifier is drawn.