Anthropic says serious bugs it reports get 30 days, not 90, from 1 Jan 2027; overdue reports get 30 more
Anthropic's post, dated 16 November 2026 on its page, cuts its disclosure window for high and critical reports from 90 days to 30 for reports sent from 1 January 2027, and gives overdue reports 30 more days. Thirty days is a deadline to publish, not a fix time, and the post prints no fix data.
By Parminder Kumar Sharma · LinkedIn · · 17 min read
30 days is Anthropic's publication clock, and its post prints no fix time
Anthropic's post says it is shortening the disclosure window in its coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy from 90 days to 30 for high and critical issues and to 45 days for all others, for reports made to vendors and maintainers on or after 1 January 2027. The same post tells maintainers of reports that Anthropic filed more than 90 days ago, that now exceed the deadline in its current policy and are not yet public, that they get 30 more days before Anthropic publishes them on its dashboard. The saved page is dated 16 November 2026 (the HTML prints "Published Nov 16, 2026"), so the new timelines start 46 days after the post, or 45 days after the 17 November date of the Help Net Security relay (both derived: 16 Nov to 1 Jan 2027 is 46 days, 17 Nov is 45).
Ninety to thirty is 60 days shorter, down to one third of the old window, which is 66.7 percent shorter or three times faster (derived: 90 - 30 = 60; 60 / 90 = 66.7 percent; 90 / 30 = 3). The relay calls that a cut in "the time to triage, fix, and ship a patch for a serious flaw by two thirds". The post says something narrower: the window for disclosure goes from 90 to 30 days. How long a fix takes is the maintainer's, and the post prints no figure for it.
What that does not establish. It does not establish that a fix can be shipped in 30 days, that most are, or that 30 days is too short or long enough. It does not say how many reports Anthropic has filed, how many are overdue or which projects hold them. It does not say how Anthropic defines high and critical. This site says none of those things either: it reports what each saved page prints and works out the intervals.
Whose account this is. The policy is Anthropic's account of its own policy, a voluntary norm an organisation sets for itself, not a law. Nothing in the saved pages binds any vendor. This is a compliance and regulation brief because the clock is one that others plan around. Anthropic makes the models whose bug finding it says drives the change, runs OSS Scanner and sells Claude, including the programmes the post lists; the post is written from that position.
What changed, clock by clock
The post names four clocks that move and one that does not. The relay lists the same five pairs of numbers. The table gives the old figure, the new figure and the change, with the page that prints each. The change column is this site's arithmetic (derived).
The five clocks as the Anthropic post prints them (the Help Net relay repeats the numbers). Old and new figures are printed; the change column is derived.
| Clock | Old, then new (as printed) | Change (derived) and source |
|---|---|---|
| Disclosure window, high and critical severity | 90 days, then 30 days | 60 days shorter, one third of the old (66.7 percent shorter). Anthropic post |
| Disclosure window, all other issues | 90 days, then 45 days | 45 days shorter, half. Anthropic post |
| Escalation to an external vulnerability coordinator if a maintainer does not respond to the first report | 30 days, then 15 days (Anthropic "will aim to escalate") | 15 days shorter, half. Anthropic post |
| Wait after a patch is available before sharing full technical details | 45 days, then 30 days | 15 days shorter, one third (33.3 percent). Anthropic post |
| Disclosure window for a vulnerability under active exploitation | Seven days, unchanged | No change. Anthropic post and relay |
| Which reports the new timelines cover | Reported to vendors and maintainers on or after 1 January 2027; reports in progress on that date keep their existing deadlines | Not a clock. Anthropic post |
Two points on who and what is covered. The post says the new timelines apply to vulnerabilities "reported to vendors and maintainers", so the subject is Anthropic's own reports to those parties, not every disclosure by every finder. The relay writes "vendors and open source maintainers"; the post's sentence says vendors and maintainers. And the post says "The rest of our policy remains the same": the saved pages do not print the rest of the policy, which sits on a page this site did not read.
The overdue reports, and a start date 46 days after the post
The third change in the post is about reports that already exist. The post says there are high and critical severity vulnerabilities that Anthropic reported over 90 days ago, that now exceed the deadline in its current policy and that have not yet been disclosed publicly. Anthropic says it is "now notifying the maintainers of these projects that we are providing them an additional 30 days", after which it will publish the reports on its dashboard "in line with our updated policy starting January 1, 2027".
Two readings of the dates are possible, and this site resolves neither. If the 30 days start on the day of notification and the notice went out on 16 November, they end on 16 December 2026; if they start on 17 November, on 17 December (both derived: 16 Nov + 30 days, 17 Nov + 30 days). The post prints neither the notification date nor the day the 30 days start. The phrase "starting January 1, 2027" can be read as the date from which publication on the dashboard follows the new policy, which would put publication on or after 1 January. The post does not say.
The cut off is also open. "Reported over 90 days ago" counted back from the post's date of 16 November is before 18 August 2026 (derived: 16 Nov - 90 days). The post does not say what the 90 days count from. The relay writes that Anthropic "is holding" these reports and adds that they "have already outlasted a deadline three times as long as the one Anthropic is about to adopt". That is the relay's wording of a ratio the post supports only as arithmetic (derived: 90 / 30 = 3, and a report "over 90 days" old is at least that); the post says the reports exceed the current deadline and does not say by how much. The post prints no count of these reports and no project name, so this brief cannot say whether any reader's dependency is among them.
Two 30 day clocks that may not agree
A high or critical report now has a 30 day disclosure window. The post also says Anthropic will "wait 30 days instead of 45 after a patch is available before sharing full technical details". When both could apply, the post does not say which governs. The arithmetic shows when the question matters (derived). Take a patch that is available on day p after the report. Thirty days later is day p + 30.
Day on which a 30 day wait after a patch ends, against the 30 day window for high and critical reports. Derived: day of patch + 30. The post does not say which clock governs.
| Patch available on day | 30 days after the patch is day | Against the 30 day window |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 30 | Same day |
| 10 | 40 | 10 days after the window ends |
| 15 | 45 | 15 days after the window ends |
| 20 | 50 | 20 days after the window ends |
| 30 | 60 | 30 days after the window ends |
For a high or critical report a wait of 30 days after a patch can never end before day 30 (derived: p + 30 is at least 30 for any p of zero or more). So if the earlier of the two clocks applies, the post patch wait never shortens a high or critical deadline. If the later one applies, a patch on day 20 puts full technical details on day 50, 20 days after the window. For the 45 day window on all other issues the order can flip: a patch before day 15 ends the wait before day 45 (derived: p + 30 < 45 when p < 15). Under the old figures, a patch before day 45 ended the wait before the 90 day window did (derived: p + 45 < 90 when p < 45). The post does not say whether "disclosure" at the end of the window means the full technical details or a dashboard entry, so this table is arithmetic on the two printed numbers and nothing more.
Project Zero's clocks, and the fix times on its own table
This site's brief 718 read Project Zero's policy post, dated 13 November 2026 on its page, and its Reporting Transparency page. The Anthropic post is dated 3 days later (derived: 13 to 16 November). The Anthropic post does not mention Project Zero, and no saved page for this brief links the two policies as cause and effect. The relay's own page lists a Project Zero story among its related headlines, nothing more.
Anthropic's post against Project Zero's post, as brief 718 read it. Project Zero is a Google team. The two policies measure different things: a clock for one company's reports to vendors and maintainers, and a published policy of another company's team.
| Item | Anthropic post (16 Nov 2026) | Project Zero post (13 Nov 2026, brief 718) |
|---|---|---|
| Shortest step and its start | 30 days for high and critical, 45 for others, from reports on or after 1 Jan 2027 | Full 60 from 2 Feb 2027, then Full 30 from 3 Jan 2028 |
| Is the bug fixed? | Window of 30 or 45 days, plus a 30 day wait after a patch before full technical details | Details X days after the report, fixed or not. Its post calls patch soak time no longer meaningful |
| Severity | High and critical against all others | Its post says severity is not an effective metric for disclosure decisions |
| Active exploitation | Seven days, unchanged | Handled under Google's application security vulnerability disclosure policy (not read in brief 718); its standing page says 7 days |
| Reason given | Fixes no longer move at human speed and independent rediscovery is no longer unlikely | LLMs speed up finding and exploiting bugs and raise the risk that others find the same bug |
The dates differ by a long way (derived). Anthropic's 30 day step for high and critical reports starts on 1 January 2027. Project Zero's Full 60 starts on 2 February 2027, 32 days later, and its Full 30 on 3 January 2028, 367 days after Anthropic's start (derived: 1 Jan 2027 to 3 Jan 2028 is 365 days plus 2). That is not a like for like gap. Anthropic's rule applies to reports it sends; Project Zero's applies to reports it sends; each fixes a clock for its own reports. The saved pages do not say whether either will change a maintainer's behaviour.
What a fix actually takes is the number neither policy prints. The only table of fix times this site holds is Project Zero's, read in brief 718 (page update 10 November 2026). On its second table, 61 closed reports print a fix time, counted as Date Fixed minus Date Reported: 42 above 30 days, 32 above 45, 24 above 60 and 4 above 90, and 29 at 45 days or fewer, with a median of 46 days (derived by this site; the 30, 60 and 90 counts and the median are in brief 718, the 45 day count is new here). The rows were reported by Project Zero from 7 January to 6 November 2026, before either new policy. They are one team's reports to other vendors, closed rows only, so they are not a measure of Anthropic's reports, of high and critical bugs, or of open source maintainers. They show only that on the one published table, most closed rows took longer than 30 days to fix and about half took longer than 45.
What the post states, and what it does not
What the Anthropic post prints, and what neither it nor the relay prints. Read on 17 November 2026.
| Topic | Stated | Not stated |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Reports to vendors and maintainers on or after 1 Jan 2027; reports in progress keep their deadlines | Whether the 30 days run from the report or from its receipt |
| Severity | 30 days for high and critical, 45 for all other issues | How Anthropic defines high and critical, or which scale it uses |
| Overdue reports | Maintainers are being notified of 30 more days, then dashboard publication in line with the policy from 1 Jan 2027 | How many reports, which projects, what "over 90 days ago" counts from, the day the 30 days start |
| Why | Fixes no longer move at human speed; models help develop fixes; a higher rate of rediscovery | Any count or rate of rediscovery, any fix time, any share of reports fixed inside 30 days |
| Exceptions | Hard to deploy software and flaws needing a specification or RFC change get a timeline agreed with the vendor; active exploitation stays at seven days | How long an agreed timeline may be, or who decides |
| AI findings | The update does not apply to AI discovered findings without human review, such as OSS Scanner findings | The deadline that does apply to them; the relay says Anthropic did not say |
| Support | Actionable guidance with each report, a patch or mitigation where possible, an agreed pace before a large volume goes to one project | Any time limit on a patch, what happens when none is possible, or what a sustainable pace is |
| Reaction | Anthropic says shorter timelines "may put more pressure" on maintainers | Any maintainer or vendor view, which vendors have agreed, whether other AI labs will follow |
Unreviewed AI findings. The post says the update "will not apply to AI-discovered findings that have not received human review, such as those found by OSS Scanner". The saved pages do not print the deadline that does apply to them. This site's earlier brief on OSS Scanner covers that service; this brief repeats none of its figures.
What Anthropic lists for maintainers. The post names three programmes, and this brief gives them once as what the post lists, not as a recommendation: OSS Scanner, a no cost service that periodically scans a critical project's code with Anthropic's strongest models and sends the maintainers findings directly; the Claude for Open Source Program, six months of Claude Ultra at no cost for eligible maintainers and contributors; and the Cyber Verification Program, which tailors Claude's safeguards to enable legitimate defensive work. Each is open by application.
Where the post and the relay differ
The relay is a secondary. Six points where it says something the post does not, or where the two use different words. This site keeps both and resolves none.
Differences between the Anthropic post and the Help Net Security relay, read on 17 November 2026.
| Point | Anthropic post | Help Net relay |
|---|---|---|
| What gets shorter | The window for disclosure goes from 90 to 30 days (high and critical) | The change "cuts the time to triage, fix, and ship a patch for a serious flaw by two thirds" |
| AI findings without review | The update does not apply to them | Anthropic "did not say which deadline those findings follow" |
| The overdue reports | Anthropic is "now notifying" maintainers and "providing them an additional 30 days" | Anthropic "is holding" them, and the flaws "have already outlasted" a deadline three times as long |
| The date | The text prints none; the HTML prints Nov 16, 2026 | November 17, 2026, 06:46 UTC in the page data |
| Who is covered | Vulnerabilities "reported to vendors and maintainers" | Reports "to vendors and open source maintainers" |
| Who may apply to OSS Scanner | "Maintainers of critical open-source projects can apply" | "open by application to maintainers of critical open source projects": the same |
Two notes. The relay's "two thirds" is arithmetic on the window and is correct for it (derived: 66.7 percent), but it extends the cut to triage, fix and patch time, which the post does not measure. And the date rests on the relay for the day the story was reported and on the Anthropic page's own HTML for the day it was published: the post's text carries no date, so a reader who sees only the text will not find one.
What to do, in order
Take this with you
Then this site's suggestions, none of them the post's advice
- Maintainers and vendors: measure your own time from report to released fix on your last reports and compare it with 30 and 45 days. The post prints no fix data, so your own figures are the only ones that tell you where you stand.
- Publish and keep a security contact and a coordinator route, so that a report is not silent for 15 days. Anthropic says it will aim to escalate to an external coordinator after 15 days instead of 30 if a maintainer does not respond.
- Decide in advance what you will do with a report that needs a specification or RFC change. The post says the timeline for those is agreed with the vendor, so have the answer ready before a report arrives.
- State in your own policy whether AI assisted reports are treated differently. The post leaves unreviewed AI findings outside its update and does not say what applies to them.
- Security teams that consume other people's code: expect details of serious flaws in open source dependencies to reach the public 30 days after reports sent from 1 January 2027, and in 90 days or less before. Shorten your own patch cadence and check the vendor's dashboard.
- Map your dependencies against the overdue list. The post names no project and no count, so this site cannot say which they are; look for notices from your maintainers instead.
- If you read only the headline: 30 days is the clock for publication, not for a fix.
The question the post leaves open
Anthropic's post argues that disclosure norms assumed fixes moved at human speed and that rediscovery was unlikely, and says "Neither assumption holds today". It prints no figure for how long fixes take, how often rediscovery happens, or how many of its own reports were fixed inside 30 days. The one published table of vendor fix times on this site's record, Project Zero's, lists 42 of 61 closed reports above 30 days (derived, brief 718). How many days does it take you to ship a fix, and who is measuring?
Sources
- PrimaryUpdating our coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy timelines, page dated 16 November 2026 in its HTML: the 30 and 45 day windows, the 15 and 30 day changes, the overdue reports, the exceptions and the programmes listed. Read by this site on 17 November 2026Anthropicaccessed 2026-11-17
- Reported byAnthropic vulnerability disclosure deadline drops to 30 days for serious bugs, published 17 November 2026 at 06:46 UTC per page data: a relay of the post, read for the points where its wording differs. SecondaryHelp Net Securityaccessed 2026-11-17


